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To investigate amnesia between identities in dissociative identity disorder (DID), the authors assessed
explicit and implicit memory performance on a directed-forgetting task in 12 DID patients who switched
from one state to an “amnesic” state between presentation and memory testing. DID patients were
instructed either to remember or to forget neutral and emotional words. Besides an overall decrease in
explicit memory, patients demonstrated selective forgetting of to-be-forgotten, but not of to-be-
remembered words in the amnesic state. Patients did not exhibit any directed forgetting within the same
state. Implicit memory was fully preserved across states. Independent of state, patients recalled more
emotional than neutral information. These results may extend the conceptualization of memory processes
in DID, suggesting an important role for retrieval inhibition.
Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is an intriguing and com-
plex disorder. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM–IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994)
DID is described as “a failure to integrate various aspects of
identity, memory, and consciousness” with the essential feature
that functions are disintegrated so severely that there are “two or
more distinct identities or personality states that recurrently take
control of behavior” (p. 484). The nature and etiology of identities
or “alters” is still a matter of debate, however, that is mainly
centered around two competing views (see Elzinga, van Dyck, &
Spinhoven, 1998; Lilienfeld et al., 1999). Whereas the posttrau-
matic model maintains that alters can best be conceptualized as a
defensive response to childhood trauma (see Gleaves, 1996; Put-
nam, Guroff, Silberman, Barban, & Post, 1986), the sociocognitive
model conceptualizes alters in terms of cultural scripts that are
shaped by psychotherapists, media portrayals and sociocultural
expectations (see Spanos, 1994). Currently, there is a lack of
consensus on this issue among researchers in the field. As a
consequence, we will adopt a pragmatic stance and use the
DSM–IV as a point of departure without making any a priori claims
about the nature of so-called “identities.”
A characteristic feature of DID is the occurrence of apparently
severe amnesic symptoms (see Dorahy, 2001, for an excellent
review). In fact, according to the criteria of the DSM–IV, the
“inability to recall important personal information that is too
extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness” (p. 484) is
even one of the hallmarks of DID. DID patients often complain
about “losing time”; for example, they may suddenly find them-
selves in places or unexpected situations without any memory of
how they arrived there. Besides a repetitive loss of memory for
current episodes, an overall loss of autobiographical memory for
some extended time in childhood is frequently reported (Kihl-
strom, 2001; Kihlstrom, Tataryn, & Hoyt, 1993). Reminiscent of
the distinction between explicit and implicit memory in the organic
amnesic syndromes, it has been assumed that psychogenic amnesia
in DID patients affects conscious recollection, but not noncon-
scious memory processes, so that patients may be emotionally
affected by an emotional event without having a conscious recol-
lection of it (Kihlstrom, 2001; Kihlstrom et al., 1993).
Since the beginning of the 20th century researchers have tried to
understand the etiology of psychogenic amnesia. In a variety of
theories, amnesia has been regarded as the result of intentional
processes to discard negative emotions (Terr, 1991), as a physio-
logically induced phenomenon caused by chronic stress (Bremner,
1999), as a state-dependent memory (Eich, Macauley, Loewen-
stein, & Dihle, 1997), and as the (conscious or nonconscious)
enactment of sociocultural expectations regarding memory pro-
cesses in DID (Spanos, 1994). It is remarkable that in contrast to
the prominent role of amnesia in the diagnosis of DID and numer-
ous clinical observations, experimental studies on amnesia in DID
are rare.
In a study applying a directed-forgetting task, we tested whether
amnesia might be the result of a cognitive avoidance style that
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enables traumatized persons to selectively forget or discard threat-
ening information on a conscious level (Elzinga, de Beurs, Ser-
geant, van Dyck, & Phaf, 2000). In this task different categories of
words are first presented with the instruction either to remember or
to forget each word, which is followed by a memory test of the
words. Several studies in nonclinical populations have shown that
with this procedure information can be forgotten at will (see
Johnson, 1994, for a general review). Current models propose that
multiple mechanisms underlie the effects of intentional forgetting,
including differential encoding of to-be-remembered and to-be-
forgotten items resulting from selective rehearsal of remember
words, and a repression-like process at the time of retrieval that
prevents forget words from being recovered (Anderson & Neely,
1996; Johnson, 1994).
The directed-forgetting task has been used as a method to assess
whether traumatized patients engage in selective forgetting of
trauma-related information (see Cloitre, Cancienne, Brodsky,
Dulit, & Perry, 1996; Korfine & Hooley, 2000; McNally, Clancy,
& Schacter, 2001; McNally, Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, & Pitman,
1998). If traumatized individuals are more skilled in avoiding the
encoding and/or retrieval of threatening information, one would
expect a more pronounced forgetting of negative or threatening
words. However, contrary to expectations, in our study DID pa-
tients did not deliberately forget sex-related words on a conscious
level (Elzinga et al., 2000). Relative to the two control groups high
and low in dissociation, and to all other word categories, DID
patients even exhibited the highest recall of to-be-forgotten sex
words, thereby reversing the otherwise robust directed forgetting
effect.
These findings suggest that the apparent amnesia in DID pa-
tients is not primarily the result of a conscious, intentional strategy
of avoidance, at least not within the same state. A theory reflected
in the DSM–IV and common in clinical practice, states that mem-
ories in DID patients are compartmentalized in different person-
ality states, suggesting that these patients may only be capable of
selectively forgetting emotionally charged memories or words
when they “switch” from one identity to another (see Ludwig,
Brandsma, Wilbur, Bendfeldt, & Jameson, 1972; Silberman, Put-
nam, Weingartner, Braun, & Post, 1985). The purpose of this study
was to investigate whether DID patients can selectively forget
emotional information when they are asked to switch from one
state to a second “amnesic” state between presentation of the
words and the testing phase.
Systematic research on between-identities amnesia in dissocia-
tive disorders has been limited to a number of case reports (Allen
& Movius, 2000; Dick-Barnes, 1987; Ludwig et al., 1972; Nissen,
Ross, Willingham, MacKenzie, & Schacter, 1988; Peters, Uyter-
linde, Consemulder, & van der Hart, 1998; Silberman, et al.,
1985), and one experimental study (Eich et al., 1997). In these
studies, dissociative patients generally tend to report no (or lim-
ited) between-identities recall on direct, explicit tasks, whereas
they do show memory transfer on more indirect tests of memory.
In the earlier studies, these findings have been interpreted as
consistent with the idea that explicit memory is reduced in DID,
whereas implicit memory is not (see Dorahy, 2001). Transfer of
information that is inconsistent with this model was often ex-
plained by the fact that only neutral, nonthreatening information
was used, suggesting that amnesia would have been complete if
emotional material had been presented (Ludwig et al., 1972; Sil-
berman et al., 1985). So far, to our knowledge, it has not yet been
tested how memory for emotional material is affected by switching
states. In recent years, an alternative interpretation has been pro-
posed suggesting that the differential effects on memory tasks may
instead be related to the sensitivity of the tasks to the participants’
ability to control or inhibit responses, assuming that DID patients
may withhold their responses in more transparent, often explicit,
memory tasks, but may not be able to do so in more indirect
measures of memory (see Allen & Iacono, 2001; Bowers &
Schacter, 1990).
The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent and the
nature of explicit versus implicit memory for neutral and emo-
tional material between states in DID patients, adopting the
directed-forgetting method. Twelve DID patients, who were able
to alternate, upon experimenter’s request, between two states1
participated. Patients claimed to have no conscious awareness
between these states. The study consisted of three phases. During
the first phase, patients were presented intermixed neutral and
emotional words with the instruction either to remember or to
forget each word (the directed-forgetting task), and a picture-
fragment completion task. In Phase 2, patients were asked to
switch to the second state, in which explicit and implicit memory
was assessed of information presented in State 1. In Phase 3,
patients were asked to switch back to the first state, and were
administered parallel versions of the implicit and explicit tasks to
assess memory within the same state. To reduce the possibility of
intentionally withholding responses, implicit tasks were selected
that are associated with limited test awareness.
If cognitive avoidance only works between, but not within,
dissociative states, instructions to forget (emotional material)
would be particularly effective when explicit memory is tested in
the amnesic state. Because amnesia is only assumed to affect
conscious memory performance, no differences in nonconscious
memory performance were expected.
Method
Participants
Twelve DID patients (11 women, 1 man) participated, averaging 40.17
( 9.15) years in age. Patients were recruited by clinicians at two clinics
(Parnassia, Clinic for Intensive Treatment, The Hague, and Multi-
Functional Unit, MFE, Emmen, The Netherlands) and at the time of testing
each patient was engaged in a psychotherapeutic program. Patients were
asked to participate in the study by their clinician if they (a) fulfilled
criteria for DID, (b) reported interidentity amnesia, (c) would be capable of
assuming and maintaining one of two amnesic identities upon request of
the experimenter, and (d) were functioning at a sufficiently high level that
the participation in the study would not impede therapeutic progress.
Patients were given oral and written information about the aim of the study.
It was further explained that, over the course of a 90-min session, the
experimenter would request that they alternate between two personality
states or identities and that each identity would be asked to perform a series
of cognitive tasks involving neutral and emotional material, provided that
at least one of the two identities has no conscious awareness of, or direct
access to, the other’s experiences. Within these restrictions, choice of
1 The term states is being used in a purely operational way, to reflect the
fact that a patient has attempted to enter a different identity or personality
state.
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identities was left to the patients. Patients were informed that participation
was entirely voluntary. Recruitment and testing of participants were in
accordance with the American Psychological Association’s ethical guide-
lines regarding the use of human participants. Testing was carried out by
the first author.
Diagnosis was made according to the criteria for DID using the Dutch
translation of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV Dissociative
Disorders (SCID-D; Boon & Draijer, 1994; Steinberg, Cicchetti,
Buchanan, Hall, & Rounsaville, 1993). The Dutch version of the SCID-D
has a good test–retest reliability (  .96) and a good concurrent and
discriminant validity (100% and 98% respectively; see Boon & Draijer,
1994). The Dissociation Questionnaire (Dis-Q; Vanderlinden, van Dyck,
Vandereycken, Vertommen, & Verkes, 1993), a 63-item self-report mea-
sure, was administered to quantify dissociative trait symptoms. The Dis-Q
has a good internal consistency (Cronbach’s   .96 for the total scale).
The test–retest reliability is .94 for the total score over 3 to 4 weeks.
Patients scored 3.44 ( 0.57) on the DIS-Q, which lies in the average range
for DID patients (see Vanderlinden et al., 1993).
Nine of 12 patients had a comorbid clinical diagnosis of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), 2 patients had a borderline personality disorder,
and 2 had traits of borderline personality disorder. All participants gave
written informed consent for their participation in a protocol approved by
the human investigation committee of the University of Amsterdam.
Materials
Directed forgetting study. Ninety-six Dutch words served as stimulus
words in the directed-forgetting task: 48 had a threatening or sexual
connotation (e.g., perpetrator, sperm, trauma) and 48 were neutral (e.g.,
balcony, bread, newspaper). All words had unique word stems of two or
three letters. The normative probability of producing the selected words as
a first response to their corresponding stems averaged 5% (e.g., within a
nontraumatized sample 1 of 20 participants would complete the word stem
to the target word if it had not been studied before (Phaf & Wolters, 1991).
The 96 words were divided randomly into two lists that were rotated over
the remember/forget instructions. For testing purposes four equivalent lists
were compiled, each composed of 24 words (6 to-be-forgotten neutral, 6
to-be-forgotten emotional, 6 to-be-remembered neutral, and 6 to-be-
remembered emotional words). These lists were randomly divided over
four testing conditions (cued recall in State 1, cued recall in State 2,
perceptual identification in State 1, and perceptual identification in
State 2).
Picture-fragment completion task. For the picture-fragment comple-
tion task eight sets of pictures were selected, depicting common objects or
animals (e.g., horse, chair). From these pictures eight sets of successive
picture fragmentation were prepared. To assess repetition priming, the sets
were divided randomly over testing in State 1 and State 2. To obscure the
purpose of memory testing, in each phase four new picture sets were
presented together with the target sets. All tasks, except for the cued-recall
task, were performed on an iMac computer.
Procedure
Testing was completed in a 90-min session. The session started with an
introduction about the study’s aims and methods, after which informed
consent was obtained. Patients were told that the purpose of the research
was to better understand memory processes in different personality states.
Patients had already discussed which states would take part in the study
and how to switch between states with their therapist in individual sessions.
This was again briefly discussed in the session. No hypnosis was used to
facilitate a switch between identities. The memory study consisted of three
phases, summarized in Table 1.
Phase 1. In Phase 1 the patient switched to State 1. First, the directed-
forgetting task was presented with the standard instructions (see MacLeod,
1989). Participants were told that a list of words would be presented and
that after the presentation of each word, a cue would appear indicating
whether they had to remember or forget the word. The cue was either
“RRRR,” instructing the patient to remember the word, or “FFFF,” in-
structing the patient to forget the word. Participants were told that “for-
getting some words would improve their ability to remember other words,
when their memory for this long and difficult list would be tested later.”
Words were presented in the center of a computer screen for 3 s, followed
by a 0.5 s empty interval and a 2 s presentation of the cue. The screen was
blank for 1.5 s and then the next word appeared.
Following the directed-forgetting task, the picture-fragment completion
task was administered as a first presentation of the pictures. Eight sets of
pictures were displayed on a computer screen for 1 s, starting with the most
fragmented version, and ending with the full depiction of the object.
Patients were asked to identify, if possible, the object, by typing the correct
answer in an answer box that appeared on the screen after each presenta-
tion. If participants had no idea what the image represented, they could
leave it blank. After pressing the return key, the next version of the image
appeared.
Phase 2. In Phase 2 the patient switched to the amnesic State 2. This
was prompted by the following statement: “This was the first part of the
study. State 1 can now move backward and you can let State 2 come
forward.” The patient was then asked if he or she had any recollection of
what had happened in Phase 1. All patients denied any conscious recol-
lection of Phase 1 and were, therefore, again informed about the procedure.
Implicit memory was assessed first with the perceptual identification
task. In the perceptual identification task 48 words were flashed briefly on
a computer screen followed by a mask of letters (ZXTVQRBPCDS) for 1 s,
after which participants were asked to type in the word they guessed had
been presented. The screen remained blank for 1 s, and then the next word
appeared. Of the 48 words, 24 (12 emotional, 12 neutral) corresponded to
one of the four word lists presented in the directed-forgetting task, and 24
were new (12 emotional, 12 neutral). Because the time needed for identi-
fying words appeared to be rather variable among patients, an individual
threshold was determined for each patient, so that new words were iden-
tified in approximately 50% of the cases (M presentation duration  68.8
ms  9.1 ms).
Table 1
Outline of the Study Procedure
Phase Personality state Memory tasks Memory type
1 1 Word study with directed-forgetting instruction Study phase
Picture-fragment completion (first presentation)
2 2 (amnesic) Perceptual identification Implicit test
Picture-fragment completion (second presentation) Implicit test
Cued recall Explicit test
3 1 Perceptual identification Implicit test
Picture-fragment completion (third presentation) Implicit test
Cued recall Explicit test
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The perceptual identification task was followed by a second presentation
of the picture-fragment completion task to assess repetition priming.
Among the picture sets that were previously presented in Phase 1, four new
picture sets were added to obscure memory testing. Instructions were
similar to those given in Phase 1.
After having explained that words had been presented in Phase 1, the
cued-recall task was administered as a test of (predominantly) explicit
memory. Participants were presented 24 word stems on paper, correspond-
ing to one of the four lists, with the instruction to “complete the word
stems, if possible, to previously seen words and otherwise to complete the
stem to the first word that comes to mind.” Participants were asked to
complete all the stems to prevent “simulating” amnesia by simply leaving
the stems blank.
Phase 3. In Phase 3 the patient switched back to State 1. Parallel
versions of the perceptual identification, picture-fragment completion, and
cued-recall task were administered. Following the final test, the patient was
thoroughly debriefed. The purpose of the study was explained, patients
were given the opportunity to report their experiences, and were encour-
aged to ask any questions related to the study. It was further ascertained
that patients were emotionally stable before they left.
Results
Cued Recall
Average proportions of emotional and neutral target words
produced in the cued-recall task as a function of state at recall are
shown in Figure 1. First, we conducted a traditional omnibus 2 
2  2 (State 1 vs. State 2  Neutral vs. Emotional Words 
Remember vs. Forget Instruction) repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) and computed effect sizes for all major out-
comes. Second, we conducted focused t tests to test specific
predictions. All tests were two-tailed.
The omnibus ANOVA revealed that patients recalled more
target words in the same state (M  SEM  30.5  2.3%) than in
the different state (15.6  2.7%), F(1, 11)  18.23, p  .001,
d  1.73.2 In absolute terms, emotional words were recalled more
often than neutral words (emotional words  26.0  2.8% vs.
neutral words  20.1  1.9%), although this difference failed to
reach full significance, F(1, 11)  3.54, p  .086, d  0.77. No
difference was found for word valence between states, F(1,
11)  0.05, ns. The omnibus ANOVA did not yield an overall
interaction between instruction and state, F(1, 11)  1.28, ns.
According to our hypothesis, directed forgetting would occur in
State 2, but not in State 1. Contrast analyses indicated that the
results were in accord with these predictions: directed-forgetting
effect was not found in State 1, t(11) 0.26, ns, d 0.16, whereas
in State 2, to-be-forgotten words (TBF) were tended to be recalled
less often than to-be-remembered (TBR) words, t(11)  1.99, p 
.072, d  0.81. The prediction that recall of emotional words
would be reduced compared to neutral words in State 2 was not
confirmed, t(11)  1.05, ns, d  0.44. Consistent with the omni-
bus ANOVA, the mean recall was even in the opposite direction.
Perceptual Identification Task
Figure 2 shows the average percentages of emotional and neu-
tral old words (i.e., presented in the directed-forgetting task) and
new words that were correctly identified in the perceptual identi-
fication task as a function of state at test. The difference between
the percentage correctly identified old versus new words repre-
sents the degree of priming. A 2 2 2 (State 1 vs. State 2 Old
vs. New Words  Neutral vs. Emotional Words) repeated-
measures ANOVA was performed. Regardless of state, old words
were identified more often than new words (old
words  65.2  4.7% vs. new words  50.0  4.6%), providing
evidence for repetition priming, F(1, 11)  44.41, p  .0001,
d  0.94. The extent of priming was not qualified by any exper-
imental manipulation. Patients showed as much priming in the
same state (13.4  6.9) as in the amnesic state (16.8  4.1), F(1,
11)  0.20, ns, d  0.22. Directed-forgetting instructions had no
influence on perceptual identification of words (TBR
words  62.9  5.8% vs. TBF words  67.5  4.3%), F(1,
2 Cohen’s d effect size (differences scores divided by pooled SDs).
Figure 1. Mean cued-recall performance (with standard errors) for patients in States 1 and 2; baseline
completion of the words is 5%. Black bars  neutral remember; light gray bars  neutral forget; dark gray
bars  emotional remember; white bars  emotional forget.
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11)  1.47, ns, d  0.27. Neutral words (55.9  3.8%) were
identified as accurately as emotional words (59.3  5.5%), F(1,
11)  1.68, ns, d  0.21. No other effects were found in this
analysis.
Picture-Fragment Completion
The results reflect a sample of 11 participants, because 1 par-
ticipant was not able to complete the test, owing to technical error.
A one-factor (State 1 vs. State 2) repeated-measures ANOVA on
the mean difference between the first and second identification of
the pictures revealed that priming was as strong between states
(0.71  0.23) as within the same state (1.18  0.17), F(1,
10)  2.48, ns, d  0.71. Priming was significant between states,
t(11)  3.14, p  .05.
Discussion
Consistent with our first hypothesis, dissociative patients
showed directed forgetting between states, but not within the same
identity state. This was reflected by the large effect size (d 0.81)
associated with the enhanced recall of to-be-remembered words
relative to to-be-forgotten words in the amnesic state, whereas only
a marginal effect size (d  0.16) was associated with this contrast
within the same state. The ANOVA did not yield a significant
interaction between state and directed forgetting, however. This
may reflect the relative insensitivity of the omnibus ANOVA to
detect important effects, particularly with relatively small sample
sizes.
The absence of directed forgetting within the same state repli-
cates previous findings in dissociative patients (Elzinga et al.,
2000) and is in line with directed-forgetting patterns found in other
traumatized patients, including patients with PTSD (McNally et
al., 1998) and borderline personality disorder (Cloitre et al., 1996;
Korfine & Hooley, 2001). Given the high comorbidity of PTSD in
our sample, the failure to selectively forget trauma-related material
is probably not specific for dissociative psychopathology, but
presumably characterizes symptomatic traumatized patients in
general. This pattern deviates substantially from findings in non-
clinical populations, where the directed-forgetting instruction con-
sistently yields enhanced recall of to-be-remembered words com-
pared to words that have to be forgotten, even when emotional
words are presented (e.g., Elzinga et al., 2000; see also control
subjects in Johnson, 1994; McNally et al., 1998). Keeping in mind
that patients denied conscious recollection of the tasks that were
administered in State 1, let alone the instructions that were pre-
sented together with the words, it was remarkable that DID pa-
tients exhibited directed forgetting when tested in the amnesic
State 2, both for emotional and neutral words. Thus, whereas DID
patients may not be able to inhibit or selectively forget information
within the same state, they seem to do so when switching to a
different state. This differential pattern of recall within distinct
personality states may distinguish patients with DID from other
traumatized subgroups, including patients with PTSD or borderline
personality disorder.
The second purpose of this study was to determine whether
amnesia in DID mainly disrupts explicit memory, leaving implicit
memory unaffected (see Kihlstrom, 2001). In line with the expec-
tations, DID patients showed a strong reduction of explicit mem-
ory performance between states (d  1.73), whereas implicit
memory was mainly preserved. Repetition priming, as a measure
of implicit memory between states, was particularly evident in the
perceptual identification task and, to a lesser extent, in the picture-
fragment completion task. These results extend previous findings
of preservation of implicit memory and relative loss of explicit
memory across states in patients with DID (see Dorahy, 2001).
Despite the clear reduction of explicit memory in State 2, this
study provides no clear support for the self-reports of patients of
having no conscious recollection of information that was presented
Figure 2. Mean percentage of correct perceptual identification (with standard errors) of old and new words by
patients in States 1 and 2. Black bars  old neutral; light gray bars  new neutral; dark gray bars  old
emotional; white bars  new emotional.
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to them in State 1. The percentages of word recall indicated that
cued recall in State 2 was enhanced compared to the baseline
completion rate of 5%, particularly for neutral (19%) and emo-
tional (22%) to-be-remembered words. This seems to reflect a
preservation of explicit memory within the apparent amnesic state.
Given the fact that the baseline completion rate was obtained in a
nontraumatized, nonclinical sample, a direct comparison of the
percentage of word recall with the baseline rate may not be totally
reliable, however, because spontaneous filling in may be some-
what different in a traumatized sample, particularly in the case of
emotional words. Furthermore, to prevent simulating amnesia by
simply leaving the word stems blank, patients were instructed to
fill in the first word that came to mind if they were not able to
consciously retrieve a target word in the cued-recall task. To the
extent that patients guessed, the cued-recall task may therefore
have tapped implicit memory, too. Because the directed-forgetting
effect generally arises under conditions of explicit memory (e.g.,
no effects of instruction were found in the perceptual identification
task), explicit memory seems to have contributed substantially to
memory performance in State 2, however.
In contrast to the hypothesis that amnesia has the function to
ward off negative or threatening material, DID patients did not
show a reduced recall of emotional words relative to neutral words
in State 2. Irrespective of state, DID patients even tended to recall
emotional words more often than neutral material. Although not
fully significant in the omnibus ANOVA, this was a rather large
effect in terms of effect sizes (d  0.77). This finding seems to be
inconsistent with the idea that switching from one personality to
another has the function of avoiding emotionally charged memo-
ries. On the other hand, this pattern is similar to findings for
patients with organic amnesia, in whom emotional arousal im-
proved recognition and recollection of pictures (Hamann, Cahill,
& Squire, 1997).
The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent and the
nature of memory for neutral and emotional material between
states in DID patients. A direct comparison of the directed-
forgetting patterns between- versus within-personality states might
help to clarify the memory processes that may be involved in the
amnesic symptoms of DID patients. The different directed-
forgetting patterns in State 1 versus State 2 suggest that the
reduced recall of forget words in State 2 cannot be exclusively due
to differential encoding of the words (as this would have resulted
in similar directed-forgetting patterns, regardless of the state of
recall). Apparently, an inhibitory process at the time of retrieval
played an important role in the reduced recall of to-be-forgotten
words in State 2. This implies that, paradoxically, amnesia in-
volved some retrieval of information related to the original instruc-
tions. These findings are in line with a recent electrophysiological
study showing that, besides a differential encoding of to-be-
remembered versus to-be-forgotten words, retrieval inhibition of
to-be-forgotten words played an important role in the directed-
forgetting effect (Ullsperger, Mecklinger, & Mu¨ller, 2000). Gen-
eralized to memory processes outside the lab, these findings sug-
gest that amnesia in DID patients is (partly) the result of inhibitory
processes during retrieval of information or memories within one
specific state, whereas this information may be freely remembered
in a different state. The model of retrieval inhibition may also
explain why some memory tests yield evidence for forgetting,
whereas others reveal preserved, or even enhanced, memory pro-
cessing (see Dorahy, 2001). In tests in which inhibition is rela-
tively easy (e.g., free recall), information may be successfully
inhibited. When more specific cues are presented, however, as in
the picture-fragment completion task, inhibition may fail, which in
any real-life situation may result in the recollection of unpleasant
or even traumatic memories.
These results may offer an interesting extension of the concep-
tualization of memory processes in DID. The finding of (partial)
explicit transfer of information between states does not support the
idea that memory in DID patients is compartmentalized in several,
strictly separate, memory systems, each related to a specific per-
sonality state. Some limitations of the study need to be taken into
account, however, when generalizing these findings to the clinical
realm. First, it is unclear to what extent memory for emotional
word lists can be generalized to memory for personally meaning-
ful, threatening negative events: In what sense does the word
“perpetrator,” for instance, really represent the patient’s experi-
ence of abuse? Second, it cannot be ruled out that some patients
may not have changed states (completely), even though all patients
ascertained that they had done so and that they were amnesic for
everything that had happened in the first part of the experiment.
This problem cannot be tackled easily, however, because there are
simply no objective tools available to verify that patients really
switched between states. Third, the directed-forgetting instructions
themselves may have induced a pattern of selective recall and/or
forgetting by drawing attention to the remember words, resulting
in memory processes that may not occur under normal circum-
stances. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that other processes may
be at work in the etiology of amnesia in DID patients that have not
been addressed by the directed-forgetting paradigm (e.g., hypnotic
induction). These factors do not warrant such a far-reaching con-
clusion that amnesia in DID would not exist. On the other hand, it
is also important to keep in mind that the claim of dense amnesia
between states, which would apply to any sort of experiences and
certainly to any sort of words (including words that had to be
remembered), was not substantiated by the experimental findings.
In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of informing
the debate about memory functioning in DID gained through
experimental data. The data here support the notion that memories
in patients with DID may, to a certain extent, be state dependent,
with a relative disruption of explicit memory between states. The
partial preservation of explicit memory between states, on the
other hand, does not support the strong version of the dissociation
hypothesis, that alters are “truly” distinct identities with funda-
mentally separate memory systems and information-processing
capacities. This study does not speak to the reality of DID or to the
nature of alters, nor was it meant to. On the basis of these findings
it cannot be decided whether the reduced explicit memory perfor-
mance between states is related to a distinct organization of ex-
plicit memory within various states, or that it reflects the selective
disruption of intentional as opposed to automatic uses of memory
between states. Whereas the first interpretation may be considered
in line with the posttraumatic model (Gleaves, 1996; Putnam et al.,
1986), the latter might be more harmonious with a sociocognitive
approach, assuming that patients with DID may withhold their
responses as part of (nonconscious) role-playing (Spanos, 1994).
At this point, more research is needed to address the specific
question of whether a history of trauma or the enactment of a
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dissociative role is the most common factor in the etiology of
personality states in DID and its related memory processes.
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